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THE IMPACT OF THE STEIN CASES ON THE PRACTICE 
OF DEPUTIZING THE CORPORATION 
by 
Regina M. Robson • 
The use of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions has 
been a potent tool for enlisting cooperation by organizational 
defendants facing charges of white collar crime. Federal 
policies have encouraged organizations to demonstrate their 
cooperation by becoming de facto members of the prosecutor's 
team and by pressuring employees to waive their constitutional 
rights. Recently, a series of rulings in the case of United States 
v. Stein, 1 has raised issues which may have a significant 
impact on the way in which federal prosecutors use 
organizational cooperation to assist them in conducting 
criminal investigations. 
The Stein cases were the first to consider the impact of 
federal policies designed to encourage organizational 
cooperation on the constitutional rights of employees under 
criminal investigation. In attributing the actions of the 
corporate defendant to the government for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, the Stein court made the prosecutor liable for the 
actions of its corporate "deputy," and suggested possible limits 
on the utilization of information procured by organizational 
defendants anxious to avoid prosecution by demonstrating their 
own cooperation. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE DIFFICULTY IN 
INVESTIGATING WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND THE 
ARTFUL USE OF PROSEUCTORIAL DISCRETION 
• Assistant Professor, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
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The term "white collar crime" is commonly used to refer to 
the non-violent actions of a person or business for the purpose 
of wrongfully obtaining property or an illegal advantage.2 
Since white collar crime typically occurs during the course of 
an otherwise legitimate business,3 victims may be unaware that 
a crime has been committed at all, with little ability to identify 
the perpetrator. Moreover, organizational decision making may 
be so dispersed that no single individual within an organization 
may have actual knowledge of the entire range of illegitimate 
activities.4 Consequently, the expertise and cooperation of 
insiders is critical if the prosecutor is to establish a case.5 
One of the prosecutor's most potent tools in securing timely 
and meaningful cooperation by insiders is prosecutorial 
discretion: the prosecutor's right to determine whether to 
prosecute, whom to prosecute and what charges to bring.6 
Moreover, prosecutorial discretion is not subject to legal 
. 7 review. 
For business entities facing criminal charges,8 there is an 
overwhelming incentive to convince the J'rosecutor to exercise 
discretion in favor of pre-trial diversion. It was in recognition 
of the value of organizational cooperation in the investigational 
stage of a proceeding, that the government issued Federal 
Prosecution of Corporations in 1999 (hereinafter the "Holder 
Memorandum"), which identified a list of factors to be 
considered in evaluating corporate cooperation. 10 
The years after the adoption of the Holder Memorandum 
witnessed the prosecution of a number of well known 
corporations, and a crisis in confidence in the financial 
markets. 11 Acting on recommendations of the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force, in 2003, Assistant Attorney General Larry 
Thompson issued Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations, which became known as the 
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Thompson Memorandum. 12 Unlike the Holder Memorandum 
which functioned only as guidance to prosecutors, the 
Thompson Memorandum directed prosecutors to consider nine 
specific factors that evidenced the "authenticity" of an 
organization's cooperation with a criminal investigation. 13 The 
most controversial factors included: 
[T]he corporation's willingness to 
identify the culprits within the 
corporation ... ; to make witnesses available; 
[and] to disclose the complete results of its 
internal investigation; 14 
... [A] corporation's promise of support 
for culpable employees and agents, either 
through the advancing of attorneys fees, 
[or] through retaining the employees 
without sanction for their misconduct .. .. 15 
The impact of the Thompson Memorandum was to propel 
corporate "cooperation" from a passive, non-obstructionist 
attitude, to active participation in the government's 
investigation. In a speech shortly after the promulgation of the 
Thompson Memorandum, then Assistant Attorney General 
Christopher Wray succinctly advised business organizations 
seeking to avoid prosecution: "[Y]ou have to get all the way on 
board and do your best to assist the Government. " 16 The 
corporation had to become a "deputy" prosecutor; it had to 
"help the government catch the crooks."17 
If the cooperation expected from business organizations was 
expansive, so too were the rewards. The years following the 
issuance of the Thompson Memorandum witnessed a 
significant increase in the number of pre-trial diversions of 
corporate defendants. 18 At the same time, prosecution of 
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individual defendants increased, 19 resulting in what Lisa 
Griffin has described as " inverted entity liability" with 
individual defendants more likely to be prosecuted than their 
20 corporate employers. 
Not surprisingly, the Thompson Memorandum sparked 
widespread criticism 21 with relatively few defenders.22 The 
"cooperation" demanded by the Thompson Memorandum has 
been criticized as an impingement on corporate constitutional 
protections;23 a trampling of individuals' constitutional rights;24 
a seismic shift from an accusatory system to an inquisitorial 
system of justice;25 and an impetus to false and unreliable 
statements.26 It is the application of these constitutionally 
sensitive provisions of the Thompson Memorandum which 
were at the center of the controversy adjudicated in the Stein 
cases, the first cases to consider the constitutional implications 
f h 1. . 27 o sue po ICies. 
II. ACTION AND REACTION: THE STEIN CASES AND 
THE McNULTY MEMORANDUM 
The Stein cases grew out of a criminal investigation of the 
firm of KPMG LLP for tax fraud, based on its creation and 
marketing of certain tax shelters. 28 The hostile tone of the 
Congressional hearings on tax shelters convinced KPMG that it 
" intended to cooperate in order to save the firm."29 After 
lengthy negotiation with the United States Attorney's Office 
("USAO"), KPMG ultimately entered into a Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") on August 29, 2005.30 KPMG 
employees did not fare so well and shortly thereafter the 
government filed its initial indictment against individual 
defendants .31 The individual defendants, all present or former 
KPMG employees, were the claimants in the Stein cases.32 
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A prosecutor may elect to enter into a DPA if, in the opinion 
of the USAO, the corporation has demonstrated 
"cooperation."33 What form that "cooperation" took, and its 
impact on the constitutional rights of the individual defendants 
was the subject of two separate actions, Stein I and Stein II. 
In Stein I, the court held that KPMG's termination of 
advancement of attorneys' fees to the individual defendants 
violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.34 Although it declined to dismiss 
the indictments against the individual defendants, the court 
invited them to bring an action against KPMG for the recovery 
of their legal expenses.35 While a detailed analysis of the Due 
Process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims are 
beyond the scope of this paper, recent cases suggest that with 
regard to these issues, Stein I may be limited to its somewhat 
convoluted facts .36 
In Stein II, nine individual defendants claimed that certain 
statements made in response to KPMG's threats were the result 
ofunlawful government coercion in violation of the 
defendants' Fifth Amendment right against self 
incrimination.37 Observing that the Fifth Amendment restricts 
governmental and not private conduct,38 the Stein court noted 
that economic pressure exerted by an employer could amount 
to unconstitutional coercion only if such action could be 
"fairly attributable" to the government.39 The court relied on 
United States ex ref Sanney v. Montanye 40 to illustrate the 
connection between government action and economic leverage 
leveled by private actors. Montanye involved a private 
employer who conducted a polygraph of an employee who was 
suspected ofmurder.41 The employer conducted the polygraph 
at the request of the police department, and transmitted 
information directly to it through the use of a hidden 
transmitter.42 The employer threatened the employee with 
I 
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termination if he refused to submit to the polygraph.43 In 
attributing the action of the employer to the police, the 
Montanye court held that "[t]he state had involved itself in the 
use of a substantial economic threat to coerce a person into 
furnishing an incriminating statement."44 Applying the 
Montanye standard the Stein court held that KPMG's threats to 
' 45 cut off legal fees were attributable to the government. By 
brandishing a big stick - the threat of indictment - and offering 
a tempting carrot - the possibility of a deferred prosecution 
f . 46 agreement - the government made KPMG a part o Its team. 
The court also distinguished two second circuit cases47 
which found that actions of stock exchanges in proceedings 
against member brokers could not be attributed to the SEC for 
Fifth Amendment purposes, despite the fact that the exchanges 
routinely communicated the results of their investigation to the 
SEC. The Stein court noted that while the stock exchanges 
had commenced an investigation as part of administering their 
own rules, independent of a government request, the actions of 
KPMG were not routine self-policing, but were initiated 
because of a government investigation, aimed squarely at 
KPMG itself.48 Although the findings of investigations 
conducted by the exchanges were routinely reported to the 
SEC, the SEC had no prior knowledge of the investigations 
and had not pressured the exchanges to commence an 
inquiry.49 In contrast, the Stein court found that the 
government had "quite deliberately coerced and in any case, 
significantl6' encouraged," KPMG to pressure its employees to 
cooperate.5 The court found that both the investigatory 
policies of the government and the misconduct of the USA051 
created a clear nexus such that KPMG's actions could be 
imputed to the government. 52 
Shortly after the decisions in the Stein cases, criticism of the 
Thompson Memorandum appeared to reach a tipping point and 
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on December 7, 2006, the Privilege Protection 
Act was introduced in the Senate. 3 The Bill prohibited 
prosecutors from requesting waivers of attorney-client or work 
product privileges or considering the advancement of an 
employee 's legal fees in any charging decision or cooperation 
credit. 54 
Less than five days after introduction of the Senate bill, 
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty reacted by issuing the 
McNulty Memorandum. 55 While leaving much of the language 
of the Thompson Memorandum undisturbed, the McNulty 
Memorandum made two significant changes with respect to the 
government's consideration of corporate cooperation: it 
required explicit approval for prosecutors seeking waivers of 
attorney client and work product protections;56 and it 
prohibited prosecutors from considering a corporation's 
advancement of legal fees as a factor weighing against a 
finding of corporate cooperation, 57 except in "rare" 
circumstances approved by the Deputy Attorney General.58 
While the McNulty Memorandum can be said to have 
increased the transparency of the government's requests for 
information, it in no way limited the actions which a business 
entity could "volunteer" to secure cooperation credit. 
Moreover, it left undisturbed the fundamental principle guiding 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions: 
"authentic cooperation" requires an organization to help the 
prosecutor discover and prosecute wrongdoers. After almost 
five years of experience with the Thompson Memorandum, 
corporate counsel have a good idea of the type of cooperation 
that makes a prosecutor smile. If, after the McNulty 
Memorandum, prosecutors may no longer consider 
advancement of fees as a failure to cooperate, that does not 
mean that they cannot consider a voluntary corporate policy 
which terminates or denies advancement of fees to employees 
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who are targets of an investigation. 59 For the employees 
involved, the outcome is virtually indistinguishable. 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STEIN CASES ON THE 
PRACTICE OF "DEPUTIZING" THE CORPORATION 
Given the limited impact of the McNulty Memorandum in 
circumscribing the scope of corporate cooperation, the question 
remains: will Stein have any impact on federal investigational 
techniques? Part III of this paper considers what impact Stein 
may have on the federal policy of deputizing business entities 
to assist in the investigation of white collar crime and the types 
of actions which signify corporate cooperation. 
It is settled law that the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination does not apply to private actors, but only to state 
action.60 Private employers are free to conduct internal 
investigations of actual or perceived wrongdoing, and may 
terminate employees who refuse to cooperate or make 
statements. 
The question of whether a private action can be attributed to 
the government for state action purposes under the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments generally arises when state and 
private actions are blurred, either because the state has 
delegated to a private actor an action which traditionally has 
61 h . h been the prerogative of the state, or because t ere IS sue a 
"close nexus" between a private action and the state as to make 
the decisions of the private party those of the state.
62 
Moreover, the actions of the government do not escape the 
label of "state action" when the government acts in a quasi-
63 h 64 private manner such as an employer or pure aser. 
Defendants claiming state action based on the actions of 
private entities face a high hurdle. For example, courts have 
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refused to consider the actions of stock exchanges in 
investigating their members as state action, despite 
acknowledging the responsibility ofthe exchanges for self-
policing, arguably a function traditionally reserved to the 
state.65 Defendants claiming that pervasive government 
regulation of an industry is tantamount to state action, have 
fared no better.66 The fact that a private entity is highly 
regulated is not sufficient, without more, to make its actions 
attributable to the government. 67 In those cases where the 
courts have attributed the acts of a private actor to the state, 
they have done so only where the private actor admitted to 
being an agent of the state,68 or where there was government 
knowledge of or acquiescence to actions taken by the private 
entity.69 
The question of imputing the actions of private entities to 
the government has become even more critical in light of 
federal policies which equate cooperation with helping to 
"catch the crooks." Deputizing corporations to assist in the 
investigation of white collar crime can have far ranging effects 
on employees, particularly in light ofthe trend toward 
prosecution of "secondary" offenses. 7° Federal statutes impose 
criminal liability on any person who influences, or obstructs a 
federal investigation/' or who lies to a federal agent, without 
regard to whether the statement is made under oath.72 Perhaps 
the most aggressive instance of deputizing a private party 
involved an investigation of Computer Associates 
International, Inc. In that case, an executive pleaded guilty to a 
charge of obstruction because of false statements made to 
auditors and an outside law firm which he himself had hired to 
conduct an internal investigation. 73 Although the statements 
were not made under oath, the government took the position 
that the executive was liable because he knew that the results 
of the investigation were to be shared with the government in 
an effort by the company to demonstrate its cooperation.74 In 
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effect, there was no distinction between lying to the prosecutor 
and lying to an agent of the corporation. 
In its investigation of Computer Associates, the government 
"benefited" from the actions of its unofficial deputy by being 
able to bring obstruction charges based on the statements made 
to its deputy.75 The Stein court expanded this reasoning to its 
logical conclusion, holding prosecutors responsible when 
corporate deputies use coercion to secure statements from 
employees in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.76 
The critical inquiry, the Stein court noted, is whether the 
government "commands or significantly encourages a private 
entity to take the specific action."77 In Stein, the court found 
that the "encouragement" took two forms : prosecutorial 
misconduct and the federal policies embodied in the Thompson 
Memorandum.78 By basing its decision, not only on the actions 
of the prosecutor but also on the policy itself, the court implied 
that deputizing private entities to assist in federal investigations 
may be constitutionally suspect - even without specific 
requests for cooperation by individual prosecutors.79 The court 
reasoned that the policies embodied in the Thompson 
Memorandum were intended to exert enormous pressure on 
target organizations for the very purpose of encouraging them 
80 to coerce statements from employee defendants. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Stein court expanded the 
circumstances in which the actions of a private entity can be 
imputed to the government for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
Analogizing to the techniques used in investigating "street 
crimes," it is as if the prosecutor accepted "cooperation" from 
an accused bank robber, knowing full well that the robber will 
secure admissions from his accomplice by wielding a baseball 
bat over his head. Stein can be read as imposing a kind of 
prosecutorial "respondeat superior" wherein a prosecutor is 
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strictly liable for actions of a private party trying to 
demonstrate cooperation- without regard to any overt 
misconduct by the prosecutor or self-interest of the corporate 
deputy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate impact of the decision in Stein will depend on 
which strand of the court's holding proves dominant. If Stein is 
viewed as a prosecutorial misconduct case, the benefits for 
individual defendants asserting constitutional protections may 
be short lived. The McNulty Memorandum, while providing 
more transparency for prosecutors' requests for corporate 
cooperation, does little to discourage over-the-top corporate 
efforts to demonstrate cooperation. Hewlett-Packard 
Company's recent use of "pretexting" to track down leaks in its 
Boardroom suggests that corporations may have innovative 
techniques for conducting internal investigations - even 
without the overarching threat of a criminal indictment. 81 In the 
Stein case itself, KPMG demonstrated its creative approach to 
cooperation by requesting that the government identify those of 
its employees who were not being fully cooperative. In an 
effort to curry favor, it then boasted that it had done something 
'"never heard of before'- condition[ing] the payment of 
attorney 's fees on full cooperation with the investigation."82 
Arguably, any policy of conditioning corporate leniency on 
investigational cooperation is an impetus for organizational 
actions which could be devastating to individual constitutional 
rights. 
If, however, subsequent courts adopt the second rationale of 
Stein - the rejection of investigative policies which spur 
organizations to demonstrate their cooperation at the expense 
of their employees- individual subjects of criminal 
investigation may find that their constitutional rights are not 
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rendered moribund as soon as a corporate prosecution appears 
likely. Stein lays the groundwork for a ruling that would, at a 
minimum, suggest that there are some actions which a 
corporation cannot even "volunteer" and which cannot be 
considered by prosecutors, even if they have had no role in 
requesting or encouraging the action. 
Unless the challenge laid down by the Stein court is 
followed by other courts in considering federal prosecutorial 
policies, then Stein risks being confined to its facts, an 
interesting, but ultimately minor addition, to the debate on the 
evolving role of the corporation as a deputy prosecutor in white 
collar criminal cases. 
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Martin H. Zem * 
Anyone considering obtaining a Master of Business 
Administration degree (MBA) is no doubt acutely aware that 
the cost of the degree is expensive and, if past is prologue, will 
continue to increase. 1 Additionally, for a full-time student, 
cash is needed for everyday expenses, such as, housing, food 
and utilities, which will have to be paid through borrowing or 
savings. Moreover, full-time students forego opportunities for 
advancement and the gaining of experience they could have by 
working and going to school part time. Obviously, those 
striving for an MBA anticipate that it will more than 
compensate for the cost and lost opportunities. Whether the 
anticipation is likely to become the reality has been questioned. 
For instance, a professor teaching in a top-tier business school, 
to the apparent dismay of his colleagues, has posited that MBA 
holders seemed no more successful than persistent business 
leaders without the degree? Nevertheless, MBA programs are 
popular and likely to stay so.3 
If the cost of the MBA can be taken as a tax deduction, 
however, the cost is to some extent subsidized by the 
government, the exact benefit correlated with one's tax bracket. 
* Professor, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New 
York 
